Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui has conducted research on Brazil, Mexico, Latin America since 1979 at the Institut de Recherches Economiques et de Planification, Université de Grenoble, France. In 1981, Said El Mansour Cherkaoui spent one year conducting research at the University of California Berkeley, at the Center for Latin American Studies – CLAS at Berkeley and Simon Bolivar House at the Stanford University. The following year, Said El Mansour Cherkaoui joined the Institute des Hautes Etudes sur l’Amérique Latine, Université de la Sorbonne and the Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l’Amérique Latine, CREDAL in Paris where he published one of his research on the Economic Intervention of the Brazilian State.
Author: Said El Mansour Cherkaoui holds a Doctorate on Economics from the Université de la Sorbonne and the Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine, Paris. Dr. Cherkaoui conducted Research and is a Published Author at the Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l’Amérique Latine, Laboratoire 111 Associated with the Centre National de la … Continue reading Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Latin America– MOROCCO DIGITALL AFRICA
Said El Mansour Cherkaoui From NAFTA to CUSMA December 8, 1987 – December 8, 2021:From #NAFTA to #CUSMA Lic Cuautémoc Cárdenas – Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano David Fike – President of Golden Gate University Publications of Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Mexico and the Integration of North American MarketThe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed into law by the U.S….Read More
Said El Mansour Cherkaoui – ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DU SUBCAPITALISME EN AMERIQUE LATINE (1830-1930) : ARGENTINE – BRESIL – CHILI – PEROU. سعيد المنصور شرقاوي saidcherkaoui24@gmail.com Version Française: Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui est diplômé de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine et de l’Université de Sorbonne, de l’Institut de Recherche Économique et de Planification et de l’Institut de Sciences…Read More
Re-Globalization of the U.S. Trade and Reviving Mexico Supply Chain
Mexico became the top U.S. trading partner at the beginning of 2023, with total bilateral trade between the two countries totaling $263 billion during the first four months of this year.
Mexico’s emergence followed fractious U.S. relations with China, which had moved past Canada to claim the top trading spot in 2014. The dynamic changed in 2018 when the U.S. imposed tariffs on China’s goods and with subsequent pandemic-era supply-chain disruptions that altered international trade and investment flows worldwide.
Mexico’s gains mirror its rise in manufacturing, a key component of goods moving between it and the U.S. During the first four months of 2023, total trade of manufactured goods between Mexico and the U.S. reached $234.2 billion.
Overall, Mexican imports to the U.S. totaled $157 billion; U.S. exports to Mexico reached $107 billion.
Mexico–U.S. trade during the first four months of 2023 represented 15.4 percent of all the goods exported and imported by the U.S.; the Canada–U.S. share followed at 15.2 percent and then the China–U.S. share at 12.0 percent (Chart 1).
After nearly a decade, China is no longer the United States’ top trading partner. That position now goes to Mexico, with Canada right behind it. China’s getting bumped from the top two spots can be traced to the Trump administration’s 2018 import tariffs, which remain in place today; pandemic supply chain problems also played a role. In addition to reflecting an increasingly troubled Sino-American relationship, the Mexico-China swap points to “a real shift in the dynamics of the global economy — away from prioritizing low prices and greater efficiency,” writes Axios.
Reduced trade with China could mean higher costs for U.S. consumers.
Mexico positioned as a manufacturing base
Mexico’s expanding manufacturing base has offered an alternative to producing in China. Sourcing or producing goods in a nearby country is sometimes referred to as “nearshoring.” While data on recent nearshoring is thin and evidence of it is largely anecdotal, increased protectionism and related industrial policy are consistent with less global trade, more regional trade, and nearshoring and reshoring (returning production to the home country).
More activity in Mexico would support increased bilateral manufacturing with the U.S. It would also bolster Mexico’s standing as the U.S.’ leading manufacturing trading partner, a ranking it achieved in 2022 (Chart 2).
The Boomerang Effect by the Dragon of the Day: China in Mexico, Central and Latin America
Why Chinese Companies Are Investing Billions in Mexico?
In 2021, Chinese companies were responsible for 30 percent of foreign investment in Nuevo León, second only to the United States at 47 percent.
China is just catching up with the rest of the developed world and has all the right to expand its relations with Latin America like the rest of the globe, no more Monroe Doctrine or the Mercantilism Time for Latin America.
Latin American countries are opting for diverse international trade, economic and financial relationships and seeking also to learn about different cultures than the ones they inherited from the Europeans.
Since the independence movement and since the mid of the early 19th century, Latin American leaders have been seeking the inclusion of Asians in their economies as a way to reinforce their modernization drive and consolidate their urban population. Brazil and Peru have been in the forefront of such opening and acceptance of Japanese and Chinese citizens to the point that during the second war, Brazil became the target of investigations and surveillance of the Japanese community living mainly in the Sao Paulo State.
In fact, Brazil has been and still is the country who has the largest Japanese community living outside of Japan while Peru had a President of Japanese descent.
Within such historical and cultural ties of Latin America, China actually is renewing and renovating the inheritance of shared common memories that were built by previous generations.
You’re right. Eventually or hopefully it will trickle down to Central America which has way more water resources, including Nicaragua’s giant lake and the aquifers of the volcanic areas of Central America. Not to mention the easy access to the Caribbean and Pacific Oceans. Panama now rivals Chile as the most prosperous country in LATAM. The resources is one of the reasons Central America has been so unstable throughout its history. Central America also has been more friendly to the US with no territorial disputes. Central America can also individually address their corruption issues and Costa Rica and Panama are already less corrupt overall than Mexico.
The Presence of China and Diplomatic Works in the Americas Preferential Trade Agreement Costa Rica is China ‘s second largest trading partner in Central America while China is the second largest trading partner of Costa Rica . In recent years, bilateral trade between the two countries has grown rapidly. In June 2007, China and Costa…Read More
What is a trade agreement, anyway? Trade tensions between the United States and the European Union are not dissipating. The most recent spat is publicly unfolding over President Biden’s signature climate legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Nowhere was the lack of rapprochement clearer than during French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Washington last November, where he was reported to…Read More
Mexico became the United States’ top trading partner this year, as our relationship with China worsened. The milestone reflects a real shift in the dynamics of the global economy. Where once low prices were the priority … now there are more concerns at the table, including resilient supply chains and national security. Read the story @Axios
This international trade version of a schoolyard shuffle is amusing. It’s like watching two bullies squaring off, with each one threatening to land a punch, but both too afraid of the potential black eye.
Then suddenly, Mexico appears, quite like the quiet kid who brings candy to the playground, saying, “Hey, how about we be friends instead? It’s a win-win.”
The U.S. takes a moment, looks south, and goes, “Ooooooooooh yeah, I forgot about you” – followed by a forehead slap so loud, it could be heard across the border.
But this doesn’t mean we can put China on ‘read’ and ghost them completely. The dance of diplomacy must go on.
Trade dynamics are ever-shifting. The transition from a China-centric to a more Mexico-inclusive trading scenario is as inevitable as the return of the mullet haircut (please, no).
Like any narrative, there’s a history of love and hate, tariffs and trade-offs, manufacturers and, well, more tariffs. It’s reminiscent of a complicated love triangle on a reality TV show, but with the added thrill of economic consequences and political maneuvers.
Still, as we see Mexico rising like a Phoenix, let’s not forget our old pals. After all, the global economy isn’t a monogamous relationship. …
China’s downward slide has begun. COVID kicked it off. The reduction in global trade was the start, then came their insane “zero-COVID” clownery, then the inevitable fallout when they repealed it. Get ready to read more about “tofu dregs” buildings falling down, the real estate crisis already in progress, the collapse of “Belt-and-Road”, and the reallocation of manufacturing to places like Mexico, India, Vietnam, and even America as automation renders labor prices irrelevant.
On top of all of that, China is going to undergo serious brain-drain in the next decade. Smart people do not want to live under a “social credit” system, nor do they want to live in fear of a draft that would absolutely be needed as an attempted Taiwan invasion gets even more quagmired than Russia in Ukraine and PLA grunts croak by the millions.
The real question is, what will happen to the world economy when China fails. It could be the economic equivalent of Russia failing and a bunch of squabbling nuclear breakaway states appear. Both things need to happen, but it must be managed well. Of course, we don’t have any good managers around.…see more
Declining trade with China means rising costs for US consumers and companies, which could result in stubborn inflation. This can’t be effectively addressed by continuously hiking interest rates for the apparent reason: The Fed can’t fix the worsening diplomatic relations between the US and China.
The key takeaway message from your article then is that prioritizing resilience in supply chains and national security over low prices comes at a high cost—that is, high consumer prices. This can’t be fixed by rising interest rates since interest rates can only solve inflation when the cause is excess demand.…
How is it that cartels are so large, but not affecting trade?
The drug cartels focus mostly on one industry but have been expanding their reach into markets like avocados lately. I don’t see them making inroads into consumer goods. o will reduce its dependence on China so we can reduce dependence by proxy.…see more
#Mexico became the top U.S. trading partner at the beginning of 2023, with total bilateral trade between the two countries totaling $263 billion during the first four months of this year. Luis Bernardo Torres Ruiz explores this trade relationship in the latest on Dallas Fed Economics: https://lnkd.in/gMFzpV6p
As far as prices go, it’s not that much more than China when you factor in shipping cost from overseas and tariffs. Trade with Mexico isn’t the reason for high inflation, it’s because the Fed printed 6 trillion dollars during the pandemic.
“If you have an opportunity to live somewhere, why shouldn’t you be able to?” …
It may not actually be a bad thing. Whether people like it or not, the U.S. and Mexico are neighbors and necessary economic partners. When you look at all of the friction points between the U.S. and Mexico, they can all be traced back to economic under-development below the border. This results in crime, drugs, and illegal immigration. The increase in legal trade with Mexico brings more prosperity to them and provides the lower-priced imports that we have long depended on China for. This increases exchange and business cooperation between the two countries, which leads to more reciprocal economic development. This not only means Americans settling in Mexico, but also Mexicans opening businesses and buying real estate in America.
Congratulations Mexico! Well done. China continues to threaten the world and you stepped up.
This has the added benefit of the neighbor to the south having additional buying power and creating jobs in Mexico. Products might cost a bit more, but more money stays regionally and hopefully helps stem the flow of those needing to leave their countries looking for work.…
So, explain the immigration issue if Mexico is so prosperous.
Nice parts of any Mexican city are already getting pricey, unless you are actually making a full time tech salary. Look to Honduras, Guatemala and Panama
If the United States is unable to address the affordable housing crisis, it is possible that this could lead some skilled workers to seek opportunities elsewhere, including places such as Mexico City. This could trigger a number of changes, including certain cities becoming new technology centers.
Becoming the next Silicon Valley and attracting young American tech workers won’t happen just by solving the affordable housing problem. Other factors, such as regulatory and policy environments, infrastructure investments, and talent development, all influence whether a region can become a hotspot for technological innovation. And what makes Silicon Valley a global technology center is the accumulation and development over the years, in addition to economic factors.
It is indeed necessary to take into account various factors to attract and retain young skilled workers. The Government, enterprises and all sectors of society should work together to provide young people with development opportunities, create a good living environment and promote sustainable economic growth and social development.…
I agree the article and your comment are separate topics. After reading thru everyone’s comments, I find it interesting that no one has stopped to see how Americans moving to Mexico is affecting the people of Mexico negatively. The word gentrification comes to my mind. American companies already have manufacturing plants in Mexico, and pay Mexican Citizens very little to work there. Now Americans are starting to move to Mexico while getting paid salaries that many Mexicans can only dream of. Here is an article on this problem: https://ascjcapstone.com/terms/spring-2023/cabelloc/
The out-of-control housing prices in America are primarily due to the impact of our own consumers and geographical preferences. When skilled workers flock to DC, Austin, Portland, Seattle, or San Francisco to get higher-paying jobs, inflation is the predictable result. Creating artificial price controls is not a sustainable strategy. But, dispersing industry beyond these metropolises creates competition between regions and this benefits consumers.…
Mexico is already the #1 place for expats to live and work remotely. And with the proximity to the US it makes it easy for people to travel back to the States to see family and friends.
There is an article in the LA Times about a bunch of remote American workers moving to Mexico City and pushing rent prices through the roof for the locals. Now they want the Americans out. Guadalajara is already doing that within MX. And it has a ton of expats.
Publications of Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Mexico and the Integration of North American Market
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed into law by the U.S. President Bill Clinton, reducing barriers to trade and investment between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Célébration de 30 ans de Considération pour le Mexique – Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas a Berkeley en Californie, a Paris en France et a Mexico City au Mexique.
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Celebración de 30 años de interés en México, En la víspera de la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Canadá y México. Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) – Celebrando 30 Años de Consideración por México – Reunión con Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas en Berkeley, California, París, Francia y Ciudad de México, México.
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – Celebrating 30 Years of Consideration for Mexico – Meeting with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Berkeley, California, Paris, France and Mexico City, Mexico.… Continue reading
Research on NAFTA conducted in Mexico and Published by Golden Gate University, San Francisco, California where Dr. Cherkaoui was Adjunct Associate Professor from 1987 to 2001
Canada, the United States and Mexico signed a new North American trade agreement to replace NAFTA on November 30, 2018. The CUSMA (or USMCA in the U.S.) came into force in Canada in July 2020. This new agreement goes by a different name in each of the three countries that signed it. While known as CUSMA in Canada, it is called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, south of the border. In Mexico, people call it T-MEC, reflecting the Spanish name of the treaty.
Many think of CUSMA as NAFTA 2.0—and with good reason. CUSMA and NAFTA are very similar agreements in terms of general concepts. CUSMA continues the work of NAFTA and was negotiated using NAFTA as a baseline. That said, the two agreements do differ in significant ways. It is not for nothing that CUSMA runs to 1500 pages—more than double NAFTA’s page count of 741.
Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments which will be customs cleared on or after July 1, 2020, you are no longer be able to claim the NAFTA preferential treatment in Canada, the United States or Mexico. From this date on, for products “originating” in North America, you will have to claim a preferential treatment under the new CUSMA treaty.
AS OF JULY 1, customs authorities (e.g. CBSA and U.S. CBP) will not accept a NAFTA Certificate of Origin to claim the CUSMA “duty-free” treatment. For your 2020 blanket certificates of origin, prepared according to NAFTA, these will apply up to June 30, 2020, only. Effective July 1, the product must be certified as an “originating” good per a CUSMA Certification of Origin.
Unlike NAFTA, the new agreement does not call for a prescribed form. Instead, CUSMA requires a Certification of Origin, which can be included on a commercial invoice or a separate document, insofar as this new Certification contains all the mandatory minimum data elements set out in Chapter 5 / Annex 5-A of CUSMA.
Previous sample of the trilaterally agreed upon form used by Canada, Mexico, and the United States to certify that goods qualify for the preferential tariff treatment accorded by CUSMA. The Certificate of Origin must be completed by the exporter.
To allow W2C to apply the “duty-free” treatment under CUSMA to your products that will be customs cleared on or after July 1, W2C must be in possession of a valid CUSMA Certification of Origin, included either on the commercial invoice, Canada Customs Invoice or Proforma Invoice; or included on a CUSMA Certificate of Origin template of any format that contains all of the prescribed minimum data elements.
W2C has developed a CUSMA Certification of Origin template which you can access via the “Resources” tab available on our website: https://w2c.ca/en/resources/.
Also be advised that the “Rules of Origin” (NAFTA vs. CUSMA) for several products (HS Codes), have changed. Before goods produced in Canada, the United States or Mexico can be certified on a Certification of Origin, they must qualify as an “originating” product under the “Rules of Origin” of the new CUSMA agreement. A product previously certified under NAFTA is not valid if imported/exported on or after July 1. Such a product must be re-qualified and re-certified under the new CUSMA rules.
PM Justin Trudeau of Canada acted so meek and mild during our @G7 meetings only to give a news conference after I left saying that, “US Tariffs were kind of insulting” and he “will not be pushed around.” Very dishonest & weak. Our Tariffs are in response to his of 270% on dairy! –
NAFTA – Chapter One: Objectives PART ONE: GENERAL PART
Article 101 : Establishment of the Free Trade Area Article 102 : Objectives Article 103 : Relation to Other Agreements Article 104 : Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements Article 105 : Extent of Obligations Annex 104.1 : Bilateral and Other Environmental and Conservation Agreements
Article 101: Establishment of the Free Trade Area
The Parties to this Agreement, consistent with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade , hereby establish a free trade area.
Article 102: Objectives
1. The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:
a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties;
b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties;
d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party’s territory;
e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and
f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
2. The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of international law.
Article 103: Relation to Other Agreements
1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements to which such Parties are party.
2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.
Article 104: Relation to Environmental and Conservation Agreements
1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the specific trade obligations set out in:
a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora , done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended June 22, 1979,
b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer , done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June 29, 1990,
c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal , done at Basel, March 22, 1989, on its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and the United States, or
d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.
1, such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement.
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement.
Article 105: Extent of Obligations
The Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial governments.
Annex 104.
1 Bilateral and Other Environmental and Conservation Agreements
1. The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste , signed at Ottawa, October 28, 1986.
2. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area ,
signed at La Paz, Baja California Sur, August 14, 1983.
These agreements electronically are a public service for general reference. Every effort has been made to ensure that the text presented is complete and accurate. However, copies needed for legal purposes should be obtained from official archives maintained by the appropriate agency.
NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement and it is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. A PTA is an agreement between a group of countries to levy low or zero tariffs against imports from members. NAFTA took effect in January of 1994, and at the time, it was ★ “NAFTA and Labor” Posted April 23, 2020… Continue reading
NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality By Lori Wallach My New Year’s celebrations this year were haunted by memories of January 1, 1994 — the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. I remember crying that day, thinking about the proud men and women in union halls across America, the Mexican campesinos and the inspiring Canadian activists ★ “NAFTA Twenty Years Later” Posted by I … Continue reading
Read more: Trump Sours Flagging NAFTA Talks With Steel Trade War Threats | Newsmax.com POLITICAL WILL Officials say a handful of less contentious NAFTA chapters could still be concluded during the latest round of talks, and three people at the talks said the technical teams remained focused on their tasks, despite the uncertainty the steel tariff ★ Posted April 23, 2020 ★ Continue reading “Trump and NAFTA: Path of Negotiation and Reinvention”
President Trump said the United States and Mexico would be entering into a new trade deal called the United States-Mexico trade agreement, and that he wanted to get rid of the name of the 24-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, a crucial step toward revamping a trade pact that has appeared on the brink of ★ Posted April 23, 2020 ★ Continue reading “NAFTA: U.S. and Mexico Preliminary Deal”
CROSS THE BORDER WITH TACO BELL NO CROSSING THE WALL WITH SMART DETECTORS Climbing the Wall and the Van of the Migra: Border US-Mexico The issue of immigration was not tackled, reduced or resolved neither with the Bracero Program, the Maquiladoras, the opening of the Mexican Economy and its complete liberalization and privatization, and the ★ Continue reading “Immigration and North American Market” ★ Posted July 14, 2020
Collision of Immigration and Trade: North America Versus Central America Trump putting 5% tariff on Mexican imports By The Associated Press | Posted: Thu 7:53 PM, May 30, 2019 | Updated: Thu 8:08 PM, May 30, 2019 WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump says he is slapping a 5% tariff on all Mexican imports to pressure the country to do more to ★ Posted April 23, 2020 ★ Continue reading “Migration and Trade in North America: Trump Vision”
The North American Free Trade Agreement created a preferential tariff area among the United States, Canada, and Mexico beginning on January 1, 1994. However, the drive for regional economic cooperation had begun as early as 1851 with bilateral free trade negotiations between the United States and Canada. A free trade area involving the United States and all of Latin America was advocated by U.S. secretary ★ “North American Free Trade Agreement” ★ Posted April 23, 2020… Continue reading
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas el hombre que institucionalizó a la izquierda About the Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano Hijo de Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, nació en 1934, en la Ciudad de México. Es ingeniero civil por la UNAM con estudios en Francia, Alemania e Italia. Entre 1961 y 1964 dirigió el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional. Fue miembro del PRI ★Continue reading “Mexico – City 1990 ★ Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Said El Mansour Cherkaoui” ★ Posted
Why the big push for NAFTA if the promised gains were so modest and uncertain? Some of the explanation centers on the indirect benefits the United States could expect to derive from the Mexican prosperity predicted to result from its recent liberalization–if NAFTA could make it permanent. Even if NAFTA created no net trade increases ★ “US-Mexico-Canada Agreement” ★Posted July 2, 2019… Continue reading→
The North American Free Trade Agreement created a preferential tariff area among the United States, Canada, and Mexico beginning on January 1, 1994. However, the drive for regional economic cooperation had begun as early as 1851 with bilateral free trade negotiations between the United States and Canada. A free trade area involving the United States…Lire la Suite →
L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 8/29/2015 – to this date of 5/8/2022 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui [Spanish – English – French] Celebración de 32 años de Said El Mansour Cherkaoui interés en México En la víspera de la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Canadá y México, fui a México, donde continué mi conversación … Continue reading
Mexico City: August 1990 – Oakland – June 1992 – Paris, France – California: 8/29/2015 – to this date of 5/8/2022 Initial Research and Publication on Regional Market Integration Case – Studies of the European Economic Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement Mexico – US – Canada L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre…Continue Reading →
★ Canada ★ United States ★ Mexico ★ Agreement Trump signs USMCA, ‘ending the NAFTA nightmare’ Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments which will be customs cleared on or after July 1, 2020, you are no longer…Continue Reading →
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We are always available to answer in detail any questions our clients may have regarding the aforementioned information . Contact us at: support@triconsultingkyoto.com
In this article, you will also discover and browse my #research, my analyzes and my #publications on #Brazil, #Mexico and #southamerica.
Some of these articles will describe my progressive involvement with Latin American affairs and the importance of Latin American personalities / Americanist out-of-the-ordinary individuals who paved the way before me and in front of me and took my hand to guide me to share with them many crossroads of knowledge and generosity while they were my Mentors and my university professors and colleagues in research centers and universities as well as in real everyday life in Africa, Europe, Mexico, Austin – Texas, Oakland, California and the rest of Latin America.
In the United States, Golden Gate University of San Francisco published in 1991 – 1995 extracts from my research on the North American Free Trade Agreement and areas of my research.
The articles I am listed with their weblinks here below cover the aforementioned periods as references and sources that have also served as a launching pad for new research and knowledge interests that have shaped my current writings and my recent publications and those offered to you here.
* Note: According to Dean William Glade, Former President of the U.S. Latin American Scholars Association and Director of Latin American Studies Center at the University of Texas, Austin, only Steve Topik and myself were the first to start such research among the entire community of Latin American Scholars: the corresponding attestation is with the letters of recommendations displayed here below.
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Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (born 27 October 1945) is a Brazilian politician and former trade union leader who is the 39th and current President of Brazil since 2023. Previously, Lula was the 35th president from 2003 to 2011. He is a co-founder and member of the Workers’ Party.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva O homem do ano – O tempo é a essência da ação
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, conhecido mononimamente como Lula, é um político e sindicalista brasileiro. Depois de servir anteriormente como 35º presidente do Brasil de 2003 a 2010, ele é o atual presidente eleito do Brasil, e deve ser empossado como o 39º presidente em 2023
Dimanche, 30 octobre 2022, Oh Lala Hola Lula é eleito presidente do Brasil, um retorno notável e uma reviravolta na história que demonstra que o caso passado com a Casa Branca de Trump não ajudou Jair Bolsonaro
O candidato de esquerda Lula foi eleito presidente do Brasil no domingo contra o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro
A votação foi particularmente apertada.
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva – The Man of the Year – Time is the Essence of Action
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, is a Brazilian politician and trade unionist. After serving as Brazil’s 35th president from 2003 to 2010, he is Brazil’s current president-elect and is expected to be inaugurated as the 39th president in 2023.
Sunday October 30, 2022, Oh Lala Hola Lula is elected President of Brazil, a remarkable return and a twist of history which demonstrates that the past affair with the White House of Trump did not help Jair Bolsonaro
Left-wing candidate Lula was elected president of Brazil on Sunday against outgoing president Jair Bolsonaro.
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, dit Lula, est un homme politique et syndicaliste brésilien. Après avoir été le 35e président du Brésil de 2003 à 2010, il est l’actuel président élu du Brésil et devrait être investi en tant que 39e président en 2023.
Dimanche 30 octobre 2022, Oh Lala Hola Lula est élu Président du Brésil, un retour remarqué et un rebondissement de l’histoire qui démontre que l’affaire passée avec la Maison Blanche de Trump n’a pas aidé Jair Bolsonaro
Le candidat de gauche Lula a été élu dimanche président du Brésil face au président sortant Jair Bolsonaro.
Publications and Research on Brazil and Central and South America
Celso Furtado advise me to enroll as a PhD student and researcher at the l’Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine – as the first Moroccan in this Institute for Advanced Studies in Latin America.
IHEAL plays a central role in relations between France and Latin America in five areas, in cooperation with its partners in Europe and the Americas: training, scientific research, documentation, publishing and cooperation international expertise.
L’IHEAL joue un rôle central dans les relations entre la France et l’Amérique latine dans cinq domaines, en coopération avec ses partenaires en Europe et dans les Amériques : la formation, la recherche scientifique, la documentation, l’édition et la coopération internationale de l’expertise.
With Celso Furtado and Raymond Prats guidance at the CREDAL, I conducted this research. The focus is to analyze the determinations and the results of the intervention of the Brazilian State in shaping the economic development and facilitating the transition between the Old Republic and the emergence of industrialists, Tenentes and technocrats within the spheres of the central decision-making.
Professor William Glade (see copy of his Dr. Glade’s letter, here above he second letter of recommendation listed in this PDF file:Dr.-Said-El-Mansour-Cherkaoui-Letters-on-Research-in-Paris-France-and-Academic-Business-in-California) has defined this work as a pioneer in its field of research on Brazil and through correspondence, he stated that only 2 Scholars inaugurated such area of research, Professor Steve Topik and Said El Mansour Cherkaoui.
In recognition of such work, Dr. William Glade deposited a copy of my Research at the Prestigious Library of the University of Austin, Texas, here is the link:
According to Dean and Professor William Glade at the University of Texas. I had the privilege of meeting with Dean and Professor William Glade in Paris at the Centre de Recherches et de Documentation sur l’Amérique Latine (CREDAL where I was Associate Researcher} and he asked me for a copy of my publication by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique – CNRS.
Dr. William Glade had the courtesy to correspond with me and stating in his letter that my Research is a pioneering and only Steve Topic and myself were the ones who started this research on Brazil and the early intervention of the State in defining the strategic economic policy of development, for the corresponding letter sent to me by this Scholar William Glade , see the section here aforementioned file:see copy of his Dr. Glade’s letter, here above he second letter of recommendation listed in this PDF file:Dr.-Said-El-Mansour-Cherkaoui-Letters-on-Research-in-Paris-France-and-Academic-Business-in-California.
Dr. William Glade appreciated my pioneering work of research on Brazil and to demonstrate on his part such appreciation on its content, he has deposited my publication at the Library of the University of Texas at Austin which houses one of the largest collections on Latin America.
ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DU SUBCAPITALISME EN AMERIQUE LATINE (1830-1930) : ARGENTINE – BRESIL – CHILI – PEROU. سعيد المنصور شرقاوي saidcherkaoui24@gmail.com Version Française: Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui est diplômé de l’Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine et de l’Université de Sorbonne, de l’Institut de Recherche Economique et de Planification et de l’Institut de Sciences…Lire laSuite →
Political Corruption and Samba Festival in the Alvorada Palace = Petrobras pays corruption settlement Brazilian state-run oil giant Petrobras has agreed to pay a $853.2 million over one of the largest corruption scandals to ever hit Brazil. …Lire la Suite →
Brazil reintroduces a tax on US ethanol imports. A setback for Donald Trump, who would like to sign up for a second term …
Brasilia restored a 20% tariff on US ethanol imports. Washington authorities administration, have put a lot of pressure to maintain a favorable exemption for the US ethanol given the importance this…Continue Reading →t
★ The United States and Brazil signed three agreements Monday October 19, 2020, they said would expand and deepen their existing trade deal, the latest bonding moment under Presidents Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro. The new protocol adds chapters on facilitating trade, regulatory practices and anti-corruption measures. BRASILIA – Export-Import Bank of the United States…Continue Reading →
Three Heads of State Falling out of Grace in Brazil Global Center for Trade – GLOCENTRA – المركز العالمي للتجارة – Centre Global pour le Commerce Centro Global de Comercio Brazil’s former President Michel Temer was arrested on Thursday [March 19, 2019] in “Operation Radioactivity,” a probe of alleged graft in the construction …Lire la Suite →
Brazil’s Petrobras to pay $853.2 million in penalties September 27, 2018 This morning the DOJ and SEC announced that Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned and state-controlled energy company, entered into agreements with U.S. and Brazilian authorities “in connection with Petrobras’s role in facilitating payments to politicians and political parties in Brazil, as well as a related Brazilian investigation.”…Lire la Suite →
Recherche et Publications en Langue Française sur le Brésil de Said El Mansour Cherkaoui
LULA LIBRE ! Lula libéré de prison, accueilli par une marée rouge de partisans JAMAIS DEUX SANS TROIS: RIVALITÉ POLITIQUE ET CORRUPTION PRÉSIDENTIELLE Le Brésil n’est point étranger aux crises. Après la fin de deux décennies de règne militaire en 1985, le premier président élu directement, Fernando Collor, a été mis en accusation en 1992.…Lire la Suite →
Said El Mansour Cherkaoui publié le 1/1/2017 – Cherkaoui Journal صحيفة الشرقاوي Le Brésil n’est point étranger aux crises, après la fin de deux décennies de règne militaire en 1985, le premier président élu directement, Fernando Collor, a été mis en accusation en 1992. Le Brésil n’a pas encore échapper aux deux crises, politique et…Lire la Suite →
Said El Mansour Cherkaoui La Relation ambivalente entre l`état fédéral et les grands groupes d`intérêts privés au Brésil dans la première moitié du XX éme siècle La Relation entre la Velha Mazagao et la Nova Mazagao est une Répétition de ma Propre Histoire de Recherche Académique.…Lire la Suite →
Nouveau Épicentre de la Coronavirus Pandémie Globale: Brésil Les Prises de Position Vagues des Dirigeants, la Croyance Religieuse et la Réalité Scientifique des Cas Infectés par la Pandémie Coronavirus « En Amérique du Sud, nous sommes particulièrement inquiets étant donné que le nombre de nouveaux cas enregistré la semaine dernière au Brésil est le plus haut sur… Lire la Suite →
Publication by the Golden Gate University Review, San Francisco Interview of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Published in France Mexico – City 1990 ★ Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Said El Mansour Cherkaoui L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) – Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc … Continue reading North-Central America
Mexico City: August 1990 – Oakland – June 1992 – Paris, France – California: 8/29/2015 – to this date of 5/8/2022 Initial Research and Publication on Regional Market Integration Case – Studies of the European Economic Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement Mexico – US – Canada L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre…Continue Reading →
POLITICAL WILL Officials say a handful of less contentious NAFTA chapters could still be concluded during the latest round of talks, and three people at the talks said the technical teams remained focused on their tasks, despite the uncertainty the steel tariff plan had caused. Negotiators from the three countries have been meeting for six…Continue Reading →
President Trump said the United States and Mexico would be entering into a new trade deal called the United States-Mexico trade agreement, and that he wanted to get rid of the name of the 24-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, a crucial step toward revamping a trade pact that has appeared on the brink of…Continue Reading →
NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality By Lori Wallach My New Year’s celebrations this year were haunted by memories of January 1, 1994 — the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. I remember crying that day, thinking about the proud men and women in union…Continue Reading→
NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement and it is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. A PTA is an agreement between a group of countries to levy low or zero tariffs against imports from members. NAFTA took effect…Continue Reading →
★ Canada ★ United States ★ Mexico ★ Agreement Trump signs USMCA, ‘ending the NAFTA nightmare’ Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments Work and Research by Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Latin America L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) – Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 8/29/2015 – Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Celebración de 25 años de interés en MéxicoCelebration of 25 years of Interest in Mexico…Continue Reading →
Work and Research by Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Latin America L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) – Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre avec Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 8/29/2015 – Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Celebración de 25 años de interés en MéxicoCelebration of 25 years of Interest in Mexico…Continue Reading →
Between 1978 and 1992 {date of the launch of my research and date of the defense of my doctoral thesis}, in fact more than 14 years of research on Latin America, I wrote more than 2000 pages of which 1400 pages only for my Doctoral Thesis, Political Economy of Subcapitalism in Latin America (1830-1930): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and this I supported within the walls of the University of Paris III: Sorbonne Nouvelle and through which, I created a new Economic Theory, Subcapitalism: http://goo.gl/lYk9Su
Una vez más después del Premio Noble en tiempo real y esta vez como maravilla del mundo virtual, el mismo Hombre de la Izquierda es celebrado por la derecha: Google honró al activista y Premio Nobel Gabriel García Márquez, en lo que hubiera sido su 91º cumpleaños , con un Doodle. Márquez es ampliamente conocido…Lire la Suite →
The inflation of the prices of raw materials and everyday consumer products and the high cost of living which all impact wage demands and lead to an increase in wages whose international competitiveness only erodes the added value and especially the benefit of large national and international companies..…Continue reading →
Amérique Latine: Secteur Informel, Commerce Électronique et Subcapitalisme Le secteur informel du Pérou, du Brésil, de la Colombie comme au Mexique pour ne citer que les plus en vue, s’était érigé comme une alternative a l’inertie bureaucratique des Etats gouvernés a l’époque par des juntes militaires ou des -bureaucrates-technocratiques dont l’essentiel de la politique était de…Lire la Suite →
Le Paraguay signale le premier cas COVID-19, l’Argentine signale le premier décès en Amérique du Sud – 8 mars 2020 Amérique du Sud Dévastée par le Coronavirus La propagation du coronavirus « s’accélère » au Brésil, au Pérou et au Chili, a prévenu ce mardi une agence régionale de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé, appelant ces pays à ne…Lire la Suite →
Update: April 3, 2022 – 12:37 AM Pacific Time Originally published at LinkedIn on August 31, 2015: Building New Economic World Powerhouses on BRICS and MINT
★ Said El Mansour Cherkaoui, Ph.D. ★ Published on July 1, 2015 – 78 articles published at LinkedIn Great Wall and Great Break Banking Time for BRICS Updated…Continue Reading →
Comunidad Latina-Hispana de California Con Said El Mansour Cherkaoui
As Business Consultant at the East Bay Small Business Development Center and the Center for International Trade Development (including the East Bay Center for International Trade Development) between 1993 to 1998 and 2001 to 2007, I have worked with the Hispanic communities and their business executives and individual entrepreneurs as well as the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce of Alameda County and Sacramento.
Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui, representante del Centro para el Desarrollo del Comercio Internacional (CITD) y Marruecos en una sesión ejecutiva de trabajo y una recepción organizada por las Cámaras Hispanas de Comercio de California, Condado de Alameda, Estados Unidos de America (www.cahcc.com).
Bill Glade had a wonderful and productive life as a scholar, researcher, public servant and world traveler and he loved every one of his 91 years, living them to the fullest. He passed away at home on May 2nd.
A genial and outgoing man with a twinkle in his eye and the ability to engage anyone in conversation, Bill was equally at home in the classroom, the halls of government or eagerly visiting museums around the world. His energy was legendary.
He was born in 1929 in Wichita Falls, Texas, and spent his childhood there with his parents William and Billie Hatcher Glade and his younger sister Mary. His lifelong love of foreign travel and all things related to Latin America began early when his mother took Bill and Mary to Mexico each summer so they would learn Spanish.
By the time he entered The University of Texas at Austin, his academic path seemed clear. He received his bachelor’s in business administration and his master’s in economics, culminating with his PhD in economics in 1955, reflecting his growing interest in things international, especially in Latin America.
But the years weren’t all about academics! He met his sister Mary’s roommate, Marlene Joseph, there and they were married in 1954.
Bill began his academic career at the University of Maryland at College Park, followed by a score of years at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where he and Marlene raised their active family of two daughters and two sons and he became a Professor of Business & Economics, continuing his specialization in Latin America.
While they loved living in Madison and Bill’s reputation as an outstanding scholar was growing, the lure of their home state was strong and in 1970 they returned to Austin where Bill began his 37 years as Professor of Economics at UT, spending fifteen of those years also as Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies. Upon his retirement in 2007, he became Professor Emeritus of Economics.
Bill was beloved by his students and a great many continued to keep in touch with him long after they graduated, frequently returning for visits and special occasions. His classes were known as challenging, lively and exciting.
He was a prolific writer, with some 100 publications and still found time to give a myriad of lectures and analyses across the continent and beyond for universities, conferences, businesses and governmental agencies, sharing his expertise in Latin American economics, the economics of cultural policy and the arts, international cultural relations, international business, banking and money.
Bill and Marlene spent several exciting years in Washington, DC where Bill received a presidential appointment during the George H. W. Bush administration as Associate Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs at the U.S. Information Agency, overseeing a staff of more than 400. Among other posts, Bill was a senior scholar with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution, a consultant for the Ford Foundation and an active member of the Fulbright Commission. Bill was elected to membership in the Cosmos Club in Washington D.C. for his meritorious work in the field of economics.
Known as the perfect gentleman, Bill was always more eager to draw out other people than to talk about himself. Asked what he did for a living, he’d reply “oh, I’m an economist,” and then return the conversation to the other person.
Devoted to his family, Bill encouraged his children to explore the world and one recently remarked that as they traveled together, Bill always had more energy than anyone else and “never met a museum he didn’t like!” A world traveler by nature, Bill visited over seventy countries. Even though he was always eager to embark on world travels, there was nothing he enjoyed more than being home with his family.
He and Marlene were both supporters of the Diocese of Austin and members of St. John Neuman Catholic Church serving as Eucharistic ministers and members of various committees for many years. Bill was also a member of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulcher of Jerusalem. After his retirement from UT, he became a volunteer at Seton Hospital, becoming president of the group in 2010.
He is survived by his wife of 67 years, Marlene, of Austin; children Anita (Jerry) of Rancho Palos Verdes, CA, Genie (Charles), Patton and John, all of Austin; grandchildren, Graham, Nicholas, Katherine, Grayson, Jacqueline, Helena, Kathryn and James; great grandchildren, Wylder, Elena, Asher, Ezra, Gus and Indy.
Services are pending at St. John Neumann Catholic Church in Austin.
Mexico City: August 1990 – Oakland – June 1992 – Paris, France – California: 8/29/2015 – to this date of 5/8/2022 Initial Research and Publication on Regional Market Integration Case – Studies of the European Economic Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement Mexico – US – Canada L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre … Continue Reading →October 14, 20200
POLITICAL WILL Officials say a handful of less contentious NAFTA chapters could still be concluded during the latest round of talks, and three people at the talks said the technical teams remained focused on their tasks, despite the uncertainty the steel tariff plan had caused. Negotiators from the three countries have been meeting for six … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
President Trump said the United States and Mexico would be entering into a new trade deal called the United States-Mexico trade agreement, and that he wanted to get rid of the name of the 24-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, a crucial step toward revamping a trade pact that has appeared on the brink of … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality By Lori Wallach My New Year’s celebrations this year were haunted by memories of January 1, 1994 — the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. I remember crying that day, thinking about the proud men and women in union … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement and it is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. A PTA is an agreement between a group of countries to levy low or zero tariffs against imports from members. NAFTA took effect…Continue Reading →September 10, 2020
★ Canada ★ United States ★ Mexico ★ Agreement Trump signs USMCA, ‘ending the NAFTA nightmare’ Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments which will be customs cleared on or after July 1, 2020, you are no longer … Continue Reading →
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui1990 – 2022
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano (Spanish pronunciation: [kwauˈtemok ˈkarðenas]; born May 1, 1934) is a prominent Mexican politician. He was a former Head of Government of the Federal District and a founder of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).
I went to Mexico, where I continued my conversation with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. In fact, we had started at Berkeley in California and continued in Paris in France. In the remains of his illustrious father, Lazaro Cardenas.
During our meetings, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas presented his position and that of his party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution, whose political momentum was sparked by the success of the candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the 1988 presidential election.
This interview with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas took place in the month of August 1990 and to celebrate this total of 25 years, a summary of the relevant exchanges I was published in France that I offer to all of you in the following document.
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The North American Free Trade Agreement created a preferential tariff area among the United States, Canada, and Mexico beginning on January 1, 1994. However, the drive for regional economic cooperation had begun as early as 1851 with bilateral free trade negotiations between the United States and Canada. A free trade area involving the United States and all of Latin America was advocated by U.S. secretary of state James Blaine in 1881.
The first successful effort, however, was the landmark 1965 agreement that allowed duty-free trade in automobiles and original equipment parts between the United States and Canada. The resulting explosion of trade in the auto sector from $625 million in 1964 to over $40 billion (about a third of total U.S.-Canadian trade) by 1984 motivated the Canada-United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA), which expanded free trade to most sectors of the economy beginning in 1989. Most of CUSTA’s provisions were retained in NAFTA, which took effect in 1994 after ratification processes in all three countries revealed considerable public uneasiness over issues commonly associated with the dilemmas of trade. (10)
Although some of the motivations for CUSTA/NAFTA parallel those of the EU, both their provisions and the institutional structures that support them are vastly different. NAFTA is indisputably an economic agreement, lacking both the broader social and political sweep of the EU it contains nothing resembling the EU’s Social Charter, for example and its more ambitious long-term goals for common foreign and defense policy. Thus, NAFTA has no parallel to the EU’s web of executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, nor to its elaborate mechanisms for citizen representation. More narrowly yet, NAFTA is principally a trade agreement with only limited provisions concerning investment and none addressing the monetary arrangements and economic policy coordination that are such a prominent part of the EU. The core of NAFTA consists of a phased elimination of tariff and most nontariff barriers over ten years with a few sectors having a fifteen-year transition period. The remaining elements of NAFTA qualify this liberalization and provide a sparse institutional structure to implement the agreement and resolve disputes that arise under it.
Predictably, liberals lament that NAFTA does not go further in promoting free economic exchange. NAFTA attacks tariffs, but it does not prevent other barriers to trade such as subsidies and the procurement practices of governments. Some of these barriers pose the now familiar dilemma of competing values: Policies designed for other purposes even Canada’s government-sponsored national health insurance and America’s defense-contracting practices can be seen as trade barriers because they confer a competitive advantage on some firms. Negotiations on such matters were difficult because the structure of protection is so different across these countries, with the United States objecting principally to Canadian subsidies and Canada protesting that the United States used its trade-remedy laws to stifle legitimate competition.
Liberals also complain that NAFTA does not remove the barriers to movements of capital that prevent the most efficient combination of all factors of production. For example, a government review board is still required to approve foreign investment in some sectors of the Canadian economy, and parts of the energy sector remain off limits in both Canada and Mexico. NAFTA also contains no provision to control fluctuating exchange rates, which can distort trade because an undervalued currency will “tax” imports by making them more expensive (because it makes foreign exchange more expensive) and “subsidize” exports by making them cheaper. During the CUSTA negotiations, the National Association of Manufacturers and the AFL-CIO contended that the undervaluation of the Canadian dollar acted as a protectionist measure, but exchange rates for the Mexican peso, which have fluctuated wildly, are potentially even more unsettling. For example, the value of the peso declined 33 percent in relation to the dollar during one week in December 1994, wreaking havoc in accurately pricing imports and exports. One year after NAFTA came into effect, the peso had declined by 43 percent; at the fifth anniversary, the peso had lost 70% of its pre-NAFTA value.
If NAFTA is flawed from the standpoint of liberals, its limitations are even more alarming to those concerned about the issues that arise from trade dilemmas. Provisions to deal with those concerns, which are prominent in the EU, are largely missing from NAFTA, in part because the motivations for regional integration were somewhat different in these two cases.
Motivations for NAFTA
Like the EU, NAFTA is the product of multiple motivations, the importance of which differed across the three countries. Both Canada and Mexico were driven principally by liberal incentives, emphasizing the value of economic growth over equality, security,and sovereignty. However, NAFTA promised efficiency gains associated with Ricardian comparative advantage that amounted to less than 1 percent of GNP for Canada. Relatively few areas of factor endowment-based comparative advantage remained unexploited because the American and Canadian economies were structurally similar and already largely open. For example, nearly 90 percent of U.S.-Canadian trade faced tariffs of less than 5 percent even before CUSTA. The liberalization that produced trade expansion among EU members began from much higher levels of protection.
However, reminiscent of the ECSC’s effect on smaller European countries, CUSTA/NAFTA offered Canada gains from economies of scale estimated at nearly 10 percent of GNP. Furthermore, because the agreement restrained U.S. trade-remedy laws, which produced forty cases of countervailing duties and antidumping sanctions between the United States and Canada from 1980 to 1987, Canadian firms can now exploit these economies of scale without fear that an economic downturn or a political campaign will trigger a disastrous protectionist turn in the United States. Such benefits were thought to be even more significant for Mexico because its smaller market ($214 billion compared to Canada’s $572 billion) offered fewer opportunities for large-scale production. Mexico also would seem to benefit more from Ricardian gains from trade even though before NAFTA its exports faced an effective trade-weighted tariff rate of only 3.5 percent in the United States (plus NTBs equivalent to another 1.3 percent).
Mexico’s principal motivation, however, was to improve industrial productivity both by exposing Mexican business to foreign competition and by encouraging foreigners to invest in Mexico. The Mexican economy had stagnated, especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, under the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the ruling party for more than three-quarters of a century. The PRI’s economic approach, said to constitute a third way between capitalism and socialism, had featured an activist state, sharp restrictions on foreign investment, and extremely protectionist trade policies. For example, in June 1985, Mexico’s average tariff rate was 23.5 percent, import permits were required (and usually rejected) for products constituting 92.2 percent of tradable output, and official prices bound 18.7 percent of products. By the late-1980s, the PRI had undergone a revolution in economic policy, which came to emphasize privatization (selling 1,000 of the 1,200 state-owned companies, including the national airlines and the telephone company); budget deficit reduction (from 16 percent of GDP to under 1 percent); elimination of government price fixing; inflation reduction (from over 200 percent to under 30 percent per year); and import liberalization (by December 1987, tariffs averaged 11.8 percent and only 25.4 percent of goods required import permits).
NAFTA became the symbol of that revolution because it lent credibility to such a marked departure from historical practice, even though more liberalization occurred before NAFTA than was expected to follow its implementation. In particular, NAFTA encourages foreign investors to regard liberalization as permanent because it binds Mexico under international law to an agreement also enforced by the power of the United States. Otherwise, they would not risk a return to the old policies that could make their investment unprofitable. Without an influx of foreign investment, capital from domestic sources would be inadequate to fuel the growth made possible by Mexico’s cheap labor force and direct access to the American market.
Judging American motivations is more difficult because the liberal gains that dominated the calculus of both Canada and Mexico were expected to be much smaller for the United States. Because of its much greater size, any gains in access to the markets of its nearest neighbors would have a negligible effect on the American economy: In 1992, total trade with Canada and Mexico amounted to only about 2 percent of U.S. GDP. Obviously, the gains from economies of scale must be tiny, and reducing already low trade barriers promised little improvement in efficiently allocating resources.
These judgments were borne out by many macroeconomic models constructed to predict the effects of NAFTA on American output and employment. The gains were difficult to estimate, but even the most optimistic assessment foresaw a positive U.S. trade balance with Mexico of only $7-$9 billion annually with a net increase of only 170,000 U.S. jobs, a little more than one-tenth of 1 percent of the U.S. workforce. The corresponding efficiency gains would be under $2 billion annually in an economy of more than $5,500 billion. These gains would have been so small that in a dynamic economy we wouldn’t have been able to verify them even after the fact. As it happened, these predictions of a $7 – $9 billion U.S. trade surplus with Mexico were entirely wrong; rather the U.S. ran a deficit of about $20 billion per year in its trade with Mexico in the late 1990s and from $20-$40 billion per year with Canada.
Why the big push for NAFTA if the promised gains were so modest and uncertain? Some of the explanation centers on the indirect benefits the United States could expect to derive from the Mexican prosperity predicted to result from its recent liberalization if NAFTA could make it permanent. Even if NAFTA created no net trade increases but only shifted some labor-intensive American imports from Asian to Mexican sources, the trade diversion would benefit the United States, which would gain more from growth in Mexico than growth elsewhere. For example, about half of Mexico’s export earnings during the 1980s went to repay foreign debt, much of it to American banks. Development in Mexico might also help to stem the tide of immigration that is increasingly politically divisive, particularly in the American Southwest.
Because nearly 70 percent of Mexico’s trade was with the United States and because Mexico seemed likely to run a trade deficit for years to come Mexican prosperity promised to improve the U.S. balance of trade. As it happened, by the end of the 1990s U.S. dominance of Mexico’s trade had grown to nearly 80 percent, in part because Mexico raised its tariffs against the products of other nations while it was lowering the rate charged to U.S. goods, giving American products about a 10 percentage point average tariff advantage. This discrimatory move perfectly illustrates regional integration as a trade policy that is liberal on the inside and mercantilist on the outside. However, while U.S. exports to Mexico increased, imports from Mexico grew much more rapidly, so Mexico has become the fourth largest source of U.S. trade deficits, after Japan, China, and Canada.
The United States was also interested in several specific sectors even though their aggregate effects might not be large. By opening the Canadian energy sector to American investment, for example, NAFTA enhanced U.S. energy security, demonstrating that regional integration can secure a classic mercantilist objective by expanding the borders of a self-sufficient area. Domains such as financial services and intellectual property represent growth sectors in the global economy in which the United States has a comparative advantage.
American motivations are also related to other strands in its trade policy. It may be no coincidence that the Uruguay Round of GATT successfully concluded only after NAFTA had been approved. Because the EU has always been able to fall back on regional free trade whenever global negotiations turned sour, the United States lacked the bargaining power to complete the deal until NAFTA demonstrated that the United States had a similar alternative. Moreover, NAFTA introduced innovations that became precedents for global agreements, including its dispute-resolution mechanism (particularly compulsory arbitration and surveillance of trade policies), its treatment of services, and its elaboration of specific rights and obligations concerning national treatment.
But the best explanation for American interest in NAFTA may derive from the Reagan and Bush administrations’ conviction that the ideal political economy is structured according to laissez-faire principles of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization. They hoped that the more competitive environment created by NAFTA would strengthen the case for pursuing a competitiveness strategy that emphasizes lower taxes, weaker labor organization, and a diminished welfare state. Thus, NAFTA constituted an external reinforcement for a liberal policy program whose internal elements had been under constant attack from critics as they were adopted piecemeal since Reagan’s inauguration in 1981. In Canada, too, NAFTA represented the culmination of a strategy of liberalization – both in the domestic economy and in foreign trade and investment – that commenced with the beginning of the Mulroney government in 1984.
Liberal proponents expected that NAFTA would bolster the similar drive that had been underway in Mexico since the early 1980s by enabling the Mexican government to appeal to the necessity of competing with American firms. They hoped that successful development there might serve as a liberal model for other Latin American nations as well. Many of these nations, like Mexico, have engaged in heavily protectionist import-substituting industrialization (ISI) in the past and, in the process, acquired large debts that are potentially destabilizing for their own political systems, hemispheric foreign relations and, perhaps most importantly, the U.S. banking system. In fact, negotiations are currently under way to expand NAFTA’s liberal vision throughout the Western Hemisphere in a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement. To see what this liberal ideal entails, we must consider how the various trade dilemmas posed by NAFTA were viewed by political actors in all three nations.
The dilemmas in NAFTA and the political response
Public opinion concerning NAFTA divided along the familiar fault lines of nation and class, but national sentiment did not reflect analysts’ expectations of relative gains. For example, most analysts believed that the United States would gain less than either Canada or Mexico and some questioned whether there would be any trade expansion for the United States at all but the objection to NAFTA on these grounds was negligible among the American public. Apparently, asymmetrical benefits provoke little concern unless the nations involved are perceived as rivals; reciprocity is more important in dealing with Japan than with Mexico. Moreover, NAFTA was expected to have less impact on aggregate economic outcomes than on the issues raised by the dilemmas of trade. Thus, in the United States, the greatest protests emerged over NAFTA’s effect on unskilled labor (in response to the distributional dilemma) and the environment (in response to the dilemma of competing values).
In Mexico, NAFTA initially escaped much of the criticism usually directed against the distributional implications of free trade policies simply because the liberalization that preceded NAFTA had already drawn most of that fire. Mexico had been in the process of reducing trade protection and capital controls since the debt crisis of 1982 and more intensively since 1987. During that time trade levels had doubled, but in real terms GNP per capita at the introduction of NAFTA in 1994 remained below its level in 1981. Thus, it was thought that the dislocation costs had already been borne, and so most saw NAFTA as a means to capture with greater certainty and permanence the benefits that the unilateral policies of the previous five years had only promised. However, a peasant revolt that began in the southern Mexican region of Chiapas in 1993 was directed against the economic priorities of the PRI especially a tolerance for adverse effects on the poor which were manifested in both NAFTA and earlier liberalization policies.
Still, NAFTA attracted the usual litany of opposition to liberalization only when its first year of existence witnessed a serious economic collapse that culminated in the worst Mexican depression since the 1930s. This outcome dealt a serious blow to the liberal creed because economic prosperity was deemed to be not only the chief benefit of NAFTA, but so great as to render acceptable the familiar sacrifices associated with trade dilemmas adverse distributional consequences, diminished national sovereignty, and the erosion of alternative values.
In Canada, the evaluation of NAFTA was colored by the experience of the previous five years with CUSTA (especially the deep recession that initially accompanied it too), the long history of uneasy economic relations with the United States, and uncertainties about the future of the federal system of Canada itself. Anxieties about national sovereignty and the outlook for labor have weighed heavily in Canadian assessments of NAFTA; these assessments became a litmus test of attitudes toward the Conservative government, which negotiated both CUSTA and NAFTA. Antagonism toward free trade contributed to the October 1993 national election in which Conservatives were humiliated by losing all but two of their 169 seats in the 295-member Parliament and winning only 16 percent of the popular vote. New Liberal prime minister Jean Chrétien originally vowed to renegotiate NAFTA but later backed off from this position.
The dilemma of national sovereignty
International agreements that preclude certain national policies as NAFTA prohibits most trade barriers invariably involve some loss of national sovereignty. Although this dilemma has affected attitudes toward NAFTA in all three countries, the issue has arisen in a different way and with a different intensity in each nation.
In the United States, national sovereignty was a minor concern, subsumed by greater apprehension about the environment and job issues though related to both. For example, NAFTA shifts some economic and environmental decisions away from national legislatures to binational review panels created to resolve trade disputes. Environmental and other groups that have considerable influence on Congress but none on these panels contend that the transfer of authority to supranational bureaucrats undermines national sovereignty and deprives citizens of rights of access to officials through elections, lobbying, and open public debates. This same issue arose much more powerfully in the context of the WTO, apparently because Americans do not see Canada and Mexico as the grave threat to national sovereignty that a global institution might become.
Mexican concern about national sovereignty produced one major concession in the NAFTA agreement: the exemption of Pemex, the Mexican national oil company, from its investment provisions. Pemex, though inefficient and corrupt, has become a Mexican symbol of independence and autonomy that has resisted privatization and retains protection against foreign competition in some areas.
The national sovereignty issue acquired its greatest prominence in Canada, where closer trade with the United States has always triggered concern about maintaining national autonomy in matters of politics, economics, and culture. The continuing fear of U.S. domination is exemplified by the fate of the 1911 Canadian-American free trade treaty. During its ratification in the U.S. Congress, some proponents represented it as a first step toward the annexation of Canada, an outcome vehemently opposed by most Canadians. As a consequence, the Canadian government was denied reelection in a campaign dominated by the campaign slogan of the opposition, “No truck or trade with the Yankees.”
The source of these concerns is not hard to see. In economic terms, critics claimed that NAFTA would increase American domination of Canada. Even before CUSTA, exports to the United States constituted 75 percent of Canada’s trade and 20 percent of its total GNP. American foreign direct investment in Canada was valued at $70 billion with 20 percent of Canada’s 500 largest firms owned by Americans. About half of Canadian manufacturing was foreign-owned, most by Americans. By 1998, 81% of Canadian exports went to the U.S. and American foreign direct investment in Canada exceeded $100 billion. More Canadian manufactured goods are exported to the United States than are consumed in Canada.
Statements like that of U.S. trade representative Clayton Yeutter to a Canadian newspaper shortly after the CUSTA negotiations do not allay those fears: “The Canadians don’t understand what they have signed. In 20 years they will be sucked into the U.S. economy.” The response is predictable; Shirley Carr, president of the Canadian Labour Congress, remarked, “It is in the interest of the United States to try to take over Canada. …They want to disrupt and disturb everything we have and bring us down to their level.”
Of course, intensive trade with a more developed and more powerful nation has fed such anxieties since the days of Friedrich List, but regional integration can be especially troublesome in this regard. Indeed, the dilemma of declining national sovereignty has even dogged the EU, though Germany is much less dominant within the EU than the United States is within NAFTA.
American dominance has been especially striking in terms of culture: “Only 3 to 5 percent of all theatrical screen time in Canada goes to Canadian films; 97 percent of profits from films shown in Canada go out of the country, 95 percent to the U.S.; 95 percent of English-language TV drama is non-Canadian; Canadian-owned publishers have only 20 percent of the book market; 77 percent of the magazines sold here are foreign; 85 percent of record and tape sales are non-Canadian.”
In response to these concerns, CUSTA’s Article 2005 states that “cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this agreement,” thus allowing a continuation of Canadian protection and promotion of cultural industries that has existed for most of the twentieth century. It is interesting that this very same issue also arose in the Uruguay Round talks, with French negotiators eventually winning protection from Hollywood film producers they regarded as symbols of American cultural hegemony.
The dilemma of value trade-offs and environmental politics
Most of the major American environmental groups opposed NAFTA, especially the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, which (unsuccessfully) sought a court order to require the administration to file an environmental impact report. For three reasons, critics feared that a commitment to NAFTA’s free trade principles would require a compromise with the value of environmental protection. First, the border region of Mexico could become an export platform for companies who want to sell products in the United States but evade American environmental standards. Second, the availability of the border region to polluting industries may produce social-dumping pressures on American state and local governments to save jobs by lowering environmental standards. Third, NAFTA opens American environmental regulation to foreign challenge because it can be interpreted as an illegal barrier to trade.
The direct environmental dangers are concentrated in the border area between Mexico and the United States, which hosts the maquiladora program. Countless reports and studies have documented it as an environmental wasteland with threats to the human population on both sides of the border, especially from water pollution. The Rio Grande, which serves as the U.S.-Mexican border for much of its length, is heavily polluted with metals and raw sewage. It provides drinking water for a million people and irrigation water for a large agricultural area, but its fecal contamination levels “regularly exceed, often by a factor of a hundred, standards to protect public health.” The New River, which begins in Mexico and flows into the Salton Sea, California’s largest lake, is known as the most polluted river in North America. Beaches within several miles of the outlet of the Tijuana River into the Pacific Ocean have been closed for ten years. In San Elizario, Texas, 90 percent of the population has contracted hepatitis by age thirty-five because of a polluted aquifer.
This pollution originates largely in maquiladora firms, fully 10 percent of which admitted that they had migrated to avoid American environmental regulations and take advantage of the weaker environmental laws and notoriously lax enforcement in Mexico. For example, the La Paz agreement of 1983 required that industries importing chemicals into Mexico return any resulting hazardous wastes to the country of origin, but a 1988 report of the U.S. EPA showed that only 1 percent of maquiladoras had done so. This record cannot be a surprise: In 1990, the Mexican federal government budget for environmental law enforcement was only $3.15 million.
Environmentalists also feared that NAFTA would trigger value trade-offs similar to those that have arisen from conflicts between various environmental policies and previous free trade agreements, including the WTO. For example, the Bush administration successfully pressured British Columbia to end a government-funded tree-planting program because it was an “unfair subsidy” to the Canadian timber industry. Similarly, government payments to farmers to promote soil and water conservation could be interpreted as an unfair subsidy of agricultural exports. Export restrictions on lumber designed to enforce practices of sustainable forestry could be considered a violation of prohibitions against export restraints. Restricting imports of food contaminated with pesticides now banned in America can be grounds for foreign governments to sue the United States for establishing non-tariff barriers to trade.
The most dramatic episode occurred in the 1994 clash known as “GATTzilla versus Flipper”, in which a GATT tribunal ruled in favor of a complaint brought by the EU on behalf of European tuna processors who buy tuna from Mexico and other countries that use purse seine nets. The United States boycotts tuna caught in that way, since the procedure also kills a large number of Adolphins, but GATT ruled that the U.S. law was an illegal barrier to trade because it discriminated against the fishing fleets of nations that use this techAnique.
Initial experience with CUSTA confirms that such environmental trade-offs will arise under NAFTA. The first trade dispute under the free trade agreement involved a challenge by the U.S. to regulations under Canada’s Fisheries Act established to promote conservation of herring and salmon stocks in Canada’s Pacific coast waters. The provision to require reporting was struck down by the dispute panel. Similarly, the Canadian government challenged the U.S. EPA’s regulations that require the phaseout of asbestos, a carcinogen once frequently used as a building material. A balance between environmental concerns and free trade principles could be achieved, but NAFTA, which lacks the EU’s recognition of the social and political dilemmas of trade, does not do so.
The distributional dilemma and the politics of labor issues
In both Canada and the United States, however, the most controversial issue concerned the impact of NAFTA on jobs and wages. Unlike the Corn Laws, which posed the distributional dilemma principally in terms of sectors of the economy, in NAFTA the dilemma emerged as a class issue. Opponents contended that NAFTA would produce a net loss of jobs, especially among the unskilled, who are least able to adjust; a decline in wages among the unskilled who remain employed; and a transition period involving disruption and risk that is excessive given the small and uncertain projected gains.
Liberal trade theory made a persuasive case for NAFTA’s long-term benefits, including more job creation than job loss, though macroeconomic computer models generally showed the net effect to be quite small. Opponents of NAFTA questioned outcomes derived from such computable general equilibrium (CGE) models because they required unrealistic assumptions such as full employment, balanced trade, and capital immobility. It is especially noteworthy that the major fear job loss was assumed away by the CGE assumption of full employment. As one critic pointed out, “We might forgive the Ford employee for being less than convinced by a CGE model that crosses a deep ravine by assuming a bridge.” Arguments for free trade often appear most convincing to those who have no stake in their truth, but for the workers whose livelihood depends on the accuracy of the trickle-down models, the theories usually seem too flimsy to justify the risks.
Labor concerns arose from the recognition that NAFTA would destroy American jobs as some U.S. firms lost sales to Mexican firms and others moved production facilities to Mexico. Opponents emphasized dislocations from NAFTA-related job loss estimated in the range of 150,000 to 500,000. The transition period can be long and painful: It was estimated that 40 percent of laid-off workers would remain unemployed a year later and that the remainder would suffer wage losses averaging 10 percent for service workers, 20 percent for manufacturing workers, and 30 percent for automobile and steel workers. Within five years, most workers would have recovered their previous wages; but 35 percent would never again make the same wages, and three-fourths of workers would not go back to the same type of job. The average cost of a job loss for a worker was estimated to be about $80,000 over a lifetime.
Proponents observed that NAFTA-related job-loss estimates were modest in relation to the 2 million Americans expected to lose their jobs every year for the next decade for reasons unrelated to NAFTA. Further, they noted that job loss to low-wage countries was inevitable even in the absence of NAFTA. Finally, they pointed out that some job gains from NAFTA were just as inevitable as some job losses. Indeed, the positive employment effects of increasing exports should equal or exceed the negative effects of increasing imports. It is no wonder that businesses emphasized their vision of an efficient, comparative advantage-based economy that would eventually result from NAFTA and that labor organizations emphasized the transition costs that would be borne before such a future could emerge.
Free trade always triggers labor’s concern about employment, wages, and social dumping, but three considerations made the issue unusually acute in the case of NAFTA. First, huge disparities in wage rates and working conditions between the United States and Mexico increase the pressure on American workers. With wages for unskilled labor roughly eight to ten times higher in the United States than in Mexico, American firms have a strong incentive to either abandon production requiring unskilled labor or move it to Mexico. Negotiating under this kind of threat, American workers may be unable to resist a decline in wage rates and living standards. “A Wall Street Journal survey of 455 senior corporate executives taken just after NAFTA was initialled, found that 25 percent would use NAFTA to bargain down wages and 40 percent would move production to Mexico.” Furthermore, a 1997 study of 600 attempts by labor unions to organize workers or negotiate a first contract revealed that “62 percent of employers threatened to move their operations instead of negotiating with the union.” (11) The factor price equalization theorem, an elaboration of Heckscher-Ohlin, states that free trade will cause all factor prices, including wage rates, to equalize across nations. Supporters hoped that NAFTA would bring a growth boom to Mexico that would result in Mexican wages rising to U.S. levels rather than American wages falling to Mexican levels, but such a result is, at best, a long way off. Labor surpluses and weak labor laws in Mexico preclude substantial upward pressure on wage rates for many years. As a result, NAFTA might lower wages in the United States without raising them in Mexico, which would be especially alarming because wages for unskilled labor are already declining in the United States. For example, during the 1980s the real wages of those without a high school diploma fell 10 percent, and a similar effect seems to be spreading to high school graduates.
Second, capital mobility, which makes the relocation of labor-intensive production to Mexico easy, sharpens the competition between American and Mexican labor, especially by eroding productivity differences between them. The factor price equalization theorem holds that wage rates will fully equalize only if the productivity of workers in the two countries is identical. Thus, the current gap in wage rates should persist so long as American workers remain so much more productive than Mexican workers, but the modernization of the Mexican economy fueled by the foreign direct investment (FDI) of American firms could erode that difference for unskilled labor. By the end of 1991, foreign direct investment in Mexico totaled about $33 billion, with nearly two-thirds of it originating in U. S. corporations. In anticipation of NAFTA, capital inflows to Mexico were estimated at $18 billion in 1992, including $5 billion in foreign direct investment.
The maquiladora program can be seen as a kind of pilot project for NAFTA, demonstrating the power of combining American capital with Mexican labor. Since 1965, firms on the Mexican side of the U.S. border, known as maquiladoras, have been permitted to import parts duty free from the United States and to export the assembled product back into the country, also duty free. By 1992, nearly 2,000 factories operating under this program employed nearly 500,000 workers, about 20 percent of the total manufacturing labor force in Mexico. Meanwhile, employment and wages for American unskilled labor had stagnated.
Third, unlike the EU, NAFTA contains very little provision for dealing with dislocations, and, unlike in Europe, the social welfare system in the United States provides less protection from structural unemployment. In Canada, where the welfare state is more advanced than in the United States, the left feared that dislocations would overwhelm its capacity and force the abandonment of prized programs of social insurance. From 1990 to 1997, the proportion of the unemployed eligible to collect unemployment insurance dropped from 89 percent to 43%. (12)
Partisan alignments reflect the Stolper-Samuelson expectation that free trade will benefit the abundant factor of production (capital, in the United States) and harm the scarce one (unskilled labor is scarce in the United States relative to the huge surplus of cheap labor in Mexico). These distributional implications of free trade explain why more than 75 percent of Republicans voted for final passage of NAFTA in the U.S. House of Representatives and why more than 60 percent of Democrats voted no even after heavy lobbying by Democratic president Bill Clinton. The Impact of NAFTA and the Mexican Collapse
More than five years after its inception, NAFTA’s effects continue to be disputed, not because the three economies remain unaltered but because the dramatic changes that have taken place cannot be definitively associated with NAFTA. Trade among the three countries has increased even more than expected – by 1999, it was more than twice its 1990 level – but the effect of NAFTA cannot be isolated from the broader liberalization strategy that was well underway in all three nations before NAFTA took effect. Moreover, trade levels were not the only source of the strikingly divergent paths taken by the three nations in this period. Both Canada and the United States entered recessions shortly after CUSTA took effect in 1989, but the downturn was far longer and deeper in Canada than in the U.S. The period from 1989 to 1996 was the longest period of below potential growth for Canada since the Great Depression in the 1930s, with unemployment rates exceeding 11 percent. Nearly 20 percent of all Canadian manufacturing establishments closed during this period, as many as half in response to the increasing competition under first CUSTA and then NAFTA. This trade competition encouraged fiscal and monetary policy designed to keep production costs low, but the competitiveness strategy also stifled growth in output, wages and employment while weakening government programs that provided social protection. Thus, rising levels of trade and even a growing trade surplus with the U.S. have not prevented a substantial increase in inequality in Canada. However, advocates of liberalization argue that these dislocations were temporary. Furthermore, they contend that the trade competition produced by CUSTA/NAFTA did not cause the painful policy changes but only demonstrated that they were necessary to correct pre-existing conditions in Canada.
By contrast, in the U.S. the recovery which began in 1992 produced the longest expansion of the post-World War II period and unemployment rates fell to around 4 percent, the lowest in more than 30 years. NAFTA does not appear to have played any substantial role in this growth, which has, however, easily absorbed whatever modest job loss may have been associated with NAFTA. Fewer than 200,000 workers under 4 percent of the total number of U.S. workers dislocated during this period have been certified as qualified for NAFTA-related Trade Adjustment Assistance. There is also little evidence that NAFTA has had much effect on U.S. wage rates; while real hourly compensation certainly has grown much less slowly than corporate profits, executive compensation, or productivity gains, such inequality in allocating the benefits of prosperity has been a growing trend since at least the late 1970’s. In short, though NAFTA has surely benefitted some and harmed others, its aggregate effect on the U.S. economy appears to have justified neither the most optimistic nor the most pessimistic predictions.
In Mexico too the effect of NAFTA is disputed because of its entanglement with other dramatic economic events, but here it is far easier to see the case made by critics. It is certainly impossible to evaluate NAFTA without considering the dramatic collapse of the Mexican economy barely a year after its initiation. The meltdown began with a currency crisis, which was marked by a 43 percent decline in the value of the peso that not only disrupted regional trade and precipitated a deep depression in Mexico but also triggered concern about Mexico’s ability to meet its foreign-debt obligation. In response, the Clinton administration, fearful of the political and economic consequences of a collapse in the Mexican economy, provided a $20 billion line of credit as part of a $50 billion international effort to rescue Mexico from imminent default.
It is instructive to note that NAFTA both contributed to Mexico’s economic problems and helped export them to the United States. The key role was played by the Mexican peso, which despite a temporary boost from NAFTA could not maintain its value under the pressure imposed by Mexico’s trade liberalization. As trade barriers fell throughout the liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mexican imports soared, producing a trade deficit that finally reached 8 percent of GDP in 1994. Ordinarily this deficit would have caused the peso to decline steadily until its equilibrium value was reached, but instead it was offset for a while by a huge but temporary inflow of capital from abroad, more than $60 billion in portfolio investment alone from 1990 to 1993. Much of this originated from foreign investors, especially in the U.S., who were persuaded by enthusiastic supporters of liberalization that post-NAFTA Mexico represented the next great investment opportunity. Inevitably, this capital inflow began to decline, putting downward pressure on the value of the peso. The Salinas government recognized that a falling peso would produce domestic inflation, erode the confidence of foreign investors, and undermine the reputation of the PRI for financial management, all of which it wanted to avoid during the 1994 presidential election. Thus, it expended treasury funds to artificially support the peso (and pressured the central bank to expand the money supply by over 20 percent). With foreign reserves nearly exhausted falling below $7 billion the new president, Ernesto Zedillo, was forced to announce a 13 percent devaluation of the peso less than three weeks after his inauguration in December 1994. This became the last in a string of incidents among them the Chiapas revolt, a contested election result, and a political assassination that had alarmed foreign investors over the previous year. The devaluation effectively acknowledged an economic crisis, which drove frightened investors to react in panic. Nearly $30 billion fled the country in a few weeks. During 1995, the peso declined by 43 percent, the Mexican stock market sank by 38 percent, inflation soared to 60 percent, and unemployment nearly doubled. With American economic interests now tied to the stability of the Mexican economy and NAFTA’s prestige bound up with the success of the Mexican liberalization program, the Clinton administration arranged an emergency bailout with help from the IMF and other institutions. When default on foreign debt loomed, both the Zedillo administration and its supporters (primarily in the Clinton administration and the IMF) were seen to give priority to bailing out investors especially those abroad while ignoring the plight of the Mexican masses.
The changes in Mexican macroeconomic policy required by the crisis itself and those imposed as part of the bailout agreement guaranteed a sharp recession that, among other effects, would reduce the trade between Mexico and the United States that NAFTA was designed to boost. More significantly, real GDP per capita, already 10% below the level it had reached at the beginning of the 1980s, declined another seven percent in 1995. As the economy hit bottom in 1995 Mexico registered a 13% decline in private consumption, a 50 percent inflation rate, interest rates at 40 percent, a 20% decline in real wages, and a 70% increase in official unemployment (to 6.3%, but another 20% were reduced to part-time work). Since then Mexico has experienced a recovery, once again led by foreign investment.
At the turn of the century, the dislocations associated with Mexico’s trade liberalization and the NAFTA agreement meant to signify its permanence are more apparent than the benefits that remain projected for the future. The dilemmas of trade have been expressed in a variety of ways. Inequality has grown substantially throughout the liberalization process. The percentage of GDP going to labor declined from 38% in 1980 to under 25% in 1990 and has likely fallen further since then. The wage gap has widened between white-collar and blue-collar workers, skilled and unskilled labor, export-oriented vs. domestic manufacturing, and between border and non-border areas. The security of workers is increasingly precarious, with fewer covered by Social Security and more employed in the informal sector, while the minimum wage has fallen to half its 1987 value. Foreign dependence has grown and self-sufficiency has declined. Not only has trade expanded, but it is increasingly integrated into the productive capacity of the economy. In 1994, 58% of the value of exports was composed of the imported inputs required to produce them (up from 12% in 1983). Foreign debt exceeds $170 billion, two and a half times its level during the debt crisis of 1982. As Teresa Gutierrez Haces puts it, “Mexico has converted itself into a country that is very attractive to international investors but not for millions of Mexicans who daily face conditions of extreme poverty.”(13)
Conclusion: lessons from NAFTA Trade ties together the fate of nations. Prosperity in one country can be “exported” to another through trade, but dependence on others can also transmit less pleasing conditions. Trade is not equally desirable under all circumstances or with all possible partners, especially because its effect on value trade-offs, distributional patterns, and state concerns can vary dramatically. In this light, regional integration offers a cautious compromise between self-sufficiency and global free trade by allowing a nation to selectively choose its partners in destiny. Despite difficulties in the past and uncertainties about the future, the EU exemplifies the virtue of such an approach, taking advantage of the economic, political, and social compatibility of its members to forge an organization that can address common problems and achieve shared goals.
The early experience with NAFTA is less clear, and the decision to bind together the fate of all three North American nations cannot yet be definitively assessed. However, a major currency crisis that began less than a year after NAFTA’s implementation in January 1994 has cast doubt on whether Mexico is yet stable enough to be a reliable member of a regional trade organization.
Nonetheless, enthusiasm for liberalizing regional agreements remains strong, especially in the western hemisphere where MERCOSUR, the Central American Common Market, CARICOM, and the Andean Community are all in operation. In fact, less than a year after NAFTA’s inauguration, 34 democratically elected leaders in the region met to initiate negotiations over a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which would reach from Alaska to Argentina and encompass a market of nearly 800 million people. Nine different negotiating groups are now considering various facets of this proposal, with negotiations scheduled to conclude by 2005. On a separate track, the U.S. is a leading member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a group of twentyone nations on both sides of the Pacific committed to greater liberalization of trade and investment. This is a far larger group its members account for more than half of global trade but it is much more loosely integrated and at an earlier stage in its development.
Trade generates dilemmas that can overwhelm its advantages unless nations and organizations are prepared to respond to them. The regional option is one strategy that appeals to some nations, but others are not located in a region where such an approach is feasible. For them, such as the Asian NICs
Bibliographical Notes:
[i] Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).10. 10. Congress had nearly blocked the initial negotiations for the less controversial CUSTA but failed to do so when the Senate Finance Committee deadlocked at 10 to 10. 11. Bruce Campbell, Andrew Jackson, Mehrene Larudess and Teresa Gutierrez Haces, “Labour market effects under CUFTA/NAFTA,” (Geneva: International Labour Office,1999), p. 8. 12. Labor market effects,” p. 9. 13. Labour market effects, p. 118
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano – Said El Mansour Cherkaoui1990 – 2022
Celebración de 33 años de Said El Mansour Cherkaoui interés en México
En la víspera de la firma del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Canadá y México, fui a México, donde continué mi conversación con Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. De hecho, habíamos comenzado en Berkeley en California y continuó en París, en Francia. Durante nuestras reuniones, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas presentó su posición y la de su partido, el Partido de la Revolución Democrática, cuyo impulso político fue provocado por la candidatura de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas en las elecciones presidenciales de 1988.
Cuauhtémoc Lázaro Solórzano (México, D. F., 1 de mayo de 1934) es un político mexicano, fundador del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) es considerado líder moral del PRD y en los amplios sectores de la población, se le ubica como el patriarca de ese partido político y tres veces candidato a la Presidencia de México. En 1997, se convirtió en el primer Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal electo por votación. Formó parte de la [Comisión Organizadora de la Conmemoración del Bicentenario del inicio del movimiento de Independencia Nacional y del Centenario del inicio de la Revolución Mexicana| Coordinador de los festejos del Bicentenario de la Independencia y Centenario de la Revolución Mexicana], ambos conmemorados en 2010, puesto que ejerció desde el 19 de junio de 2006 hasta el 8 de noviembre del mismo año, fecha en que presentó su renuncia al cargo.
Esta final entrevista con Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas se llevó a cabo en el mes de agosto de 1990 y para celebrar este total de 33 anos, un resumen de los intercambios pertinentes que se publicó en Berkeley 1989, Ciudad de México 1990, Paris, Francia 1992 que ofrezco en el siguiente documento.
Presidential Shaking Hands and Shaking World Economy
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed into law by the U.S. President Bill Clinton, reducing barriers to trade and investment between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
Celebration of more than 33 years of Said El Mansour Cherkaoui Interest in Mexico
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano (Spanish pronunciation: [kwauˈtemok ˈkarðenas]; born May 1, 1934) is a prominent Mexican politician. He was a former Head of Government of the Federal District and a founder of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). I went to Mexico, where I continued my conversation with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. In fact, we had started at Berkeley in California and continued in Paris in France.
On the eve of the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, I went to Mexico, where I continued my conversation with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. In fact, we had started in Berkeley in California and continued in Mexici City and Paris in France.
During our multiple meetings, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas presented his position and that of his party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution, whose political momentum was sparked by the Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ candidacy in the 1988 presidential election.
The last interview with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas took place in the month of August 1990 and to celebrate this total of 33 years, with an initial meeting at Berkeley 1989, followed by Ciudad de México in 1990, and in 1992 at Paris, France. A summary of the relevant exchanges I was published in France that I offer to all of you in the following document.
Joe Biden concedes that President Trump’s renegotiated US-Mexico-Canada Agreement is “better than NAFTA,” which he says he and Obama were unable to…
Recent publications of Said El Mansour Cherkaoui on Mexico and the various treaties on building Free
North American Market. A Story that started in 1982 at the Sorbonne University – Institut des Hautes sur l’Amérique Latine in Paris, continued at the University of California, Berkeley and Golden Gate University, San Francisco with field research in Mexico City in 1992 invited by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the CERDI (Center for Study and Research on the Integrated Development) and the Association of the Doctorand Mexicans who have studied in Paris.
Author: Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui was Researcher at the CREDAL – Laboratoire 111 Associated – Affiliated with the CNRS and hold a Doctorate from the Sorbonne University and the Institut des Hautes Etudes de l’Amérique Latine, Paris.
Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui’s Extract of Research Conducted in Mexico in 1990-1992 on NAFTA and Published in the Connection at Golden Gate Univerity, August – December 1993
I have introduced courses on Latin American Studies, Mexico, the European Economic Community and Asia for the First time in the History of Golden Gate University at San Francisco. My research and publications on these topics were respectively published by Golden Gate University Magazine, Specialized Revue in Lyon France and by News Media Group in London, United Kingdom.
Extract of Research Conducted in Mexico on Nafta by Dr. Said El Mansour Cherkaoui and Published in the Connection at Golden Gate Univerity, August – December 1993
Presentation of the Interview with Cuauhtémoc Cardenas by Said El Mansour Cherkaoui
Field Research Conducted in Mexico by Said El Mansour Cherkaoui including this Interview conducted at the Father Home of Cuauhtémoc Cardenas in Mexico City. The Father Lazaro Cardenas was the youngest General in the entire military history of Mexico and was a key figure in the Revolution of Mexico led by Francisco Madero and other legendary revolutionaries.
Lazaro Cardenas became the President of Mexico and was the Father of one of the first strategy of national development implemented by a Government in the countries of the South. Cuauhtémoc Cardenas has inherited this legacy and had embodied such nationalistic drive with concern to the alleviation of poverty and the equal access to all the social benefits that a State can offered and facilitated for its own citizens in a country that has been the theatre of interests from outside and antagonism from inside social class contradictions connected and stimulated by the rival external forces trying to eliminate international competition and local, regional and national resistance to their attempts and invasions to control the natural, financial and human resources of Mexico.
The following interview took place way before the signing of the Treaty on North American Free Trade Agreement. I have met with Cuauhtémoc Cardenas in California, Mexico City and Paris and maintained with him a correspondence through letters sent to his home in Mexico City. This interview was conducted in Spanish and later on translated in French given the US driven academic and media outlets did not support the views that were questioning the validity of the NAFTA for the development of Mexico or the respect of the Mexican Workers Rights.
During my visit to France, I was contacted by Mona Huerta a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique who proposed to me to have this interview to be published by a research group from Paris – Lyon, a Network of Researchers who are specialized on Mexico and Latin America.
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas el hombre que institucionalizo a la izquierda About the Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano Hijo de Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, nació en 1934, en la Ciudad de México. Es ingeniero civil por la UNAM con estudios en Francia, Alemania e Italia. Continue reading
Mexico City: August 1990 – Oakland – June 1992 – Paris, France – California: 8/29/2015 – to this date of 5/8/2022 Initial Research and Publication on Regional Market Integration Case – Studies of the European Economic Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement Mexico – US – Canada L’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) -Rencontre … Continue Reading →October 14, 20200
POLITICAL WILL Officials say a handful of less contentious NAFTA chapters could still be concluded during the latest round of talks, and three people at the talks said the technical teams remained focused on their tasks, despite the uncertainty the steel tariff plan had caused. Negotiators from the three countries have been meeting for six … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
President Trump said the United States and Mexico would be entering into a new trade deal called the United States-Mexico trade agreement, and that he wanted to get rid of the name of the 24-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement, a crucial step toward revamping a trade pact that has appeared on the brink of … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality By Lori Wallach My New Year’s celebrations this year were haunted by memories of January 1, 1994 — the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. I remember crying that day, thinking about the proud men and women in union … Continue Reading →September 12, 2020
NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement and it is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. A PTA is an agreement between a group of countries to levy low or zero tariffs against imports from members. NAFTA took effect…Continue Reading →September 10, 2020
Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments which will be customs cleared on or after July 1, 2020, you are no longer be able to claim the NAFTA preferential treatment in Canada, the United States or Mexico. From this date on, for products “originating” in North America, Continue reading
★ Canada ★ United States ★ Mexico ★ Agreement Trump signs USMCA, ‘ending the NAFTA nightmare’ Since July 1, 2020, NAFTA has been replaced by a new free trade agreement CUSMA. As an importer, exporter and manufacturer, for your shipments which will be customs cleared on or after July 1, 2020, you are no longer … Continue Reading →
Mexico – City 1990 ★ Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Said El Mansour Cherkaoui April 22, 2020 Migration and Trade in North America: Trump Vision April 23, 2020 NAFTA and Labor April 23, 2020 NAFTA Twenty Years Later April 23, 2020 North American Free Trade Agreement April 23, 2020 Trump and NAFTA: Path of Negotiation and Reinvention April 23, 2020 NAFTA: U.S. and Mexico Preliminary Deal April 23, 2020 Continue reading Canada, United States, Mexico
Collision of Immigration and Trade: North America Versus Central America Trump putting 5% tariff on Mexican imports By The Associated Press | Posted: Thu 7:53 PM, May 30, 2019 | Updated: Thu 8:08 PM, May 30, 2019 WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump says he is slapping a 5% tariff on all Mexican imports to pressure the country to do more toContinue reading
The issue of immigration was not tackled, reduced or resolved neither with the Bracero Program, the Maquiladoras, the opening of the Mexican Economy and its complete liberalization and privatization, and the Free Trade Agreements with the US and other nations around the world Continue reading
NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality By Lori Wallach My New Year’s celebrations this year were haunted by memories of January 1, 1994 — the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. I remember crying that day, thinking about the proud men and women in union Continue reading
NAFTA Overview and Its Effect on Undocumented Immigration NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement and it is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Continue reading
Why the big push for NAFTA if the promised gains were so modest and uncertain? Some of the explanation centers on the indirect benefits the United States could expect to derive from the Mexican prosperity predicted to result from its recent liberalization–if NAFTA could make it permanent. Even if NAFTA created no net trade increases Continue reading
The North American Free Trade Agreement created a preferential tariff area among the United States, Canada, and Mexico beginning on January 1, 1994. However, the drive for regional economic cooperation had begun as early as 1851 with bilateral free trade negotiations between the United States and Canada. A free trade area involving the United States Continue reading
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Said Cherkaoui 24 